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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
modern American life with its "necessity" for speedy transportation, its low
cost of automobile operation, and its consequent traffic congestion with the ever
present possibility, and too often probability, of serious accidents, some definite
codified rule became essential. Such a rule has been settled upon, and the
ordinance, the construction of which is here under consideration, is an example
of such rule. Previously, the main points of dispute have been as to whether
or not the fact that a man has the right of way will excuse what ordinarily
would be actionable negligence, whether relative position only and not distance
from the intersection were to be considered, etc. White v. Pupillo, 263 S. W.
1011 Mo.; Bollinger v. Greenaway, 83 Pa. Sup. Ct. 217; Shirley v. Larkin Co.,
239 N. Y. 94, 145 N. E. 751. The present question had not previously
been decided, and it would seem that the right construction is entirely depend-
ent upon the intent of the legislature as expressed in the wording of the statute.
Of course, when statutes provide rights of way for those traveling on streets
running in certain directions, in preference to those traveling on streets running
in other directions, as the early statutes did, it is obvious that such statutes re-
quire strict construction; even the majority of the modern statutes, when out-
lining this rule, refer to vehicles traveling on intersecting highways, and under
them it is apparent that the construction given in the instant case would be
faulty. Laws Mo. 1921 (Extra Session), p. 95, section 21, L. Assuming, how-
ever, that the Denver ordinance in question was the same as the Colorado
statute on this subject, this construction might be justified. Comp. Laws of
Colorado (1921), section 1270, provides that a driver shall yield the right of way
at the intersection of their paths to a vehicle approaching from the right at the
same time; a logical construction of such an unusually general statute might
possibly go as far as that of the Colorado court did.
Thus, it can be seen that the construction of this statute by the Colorado
court may be justified in view of the unusual wording of the statute, but it also
seems as if such construction transcends the limits laid down by legislative in-
tent however carelessly such intent was expressed. E. L. W., '28.
COMMERCE-POwER TO REGULATE ADVERTISING IN PEoDIcALs.-Statute pro-
hibiting advertising of cigarettes in any paper, magazine or pamphlet published
within the state of Kansas held unconstitutional as being repugnant to the com-
merce clause of the Federal Constitution. Little et at v. Smith, 124 Kan. 237,
257 Pac. 959.
The present action was brought in behalf of the Kansas Press Association who
alleged, in substance, that their publications were interstate in character and the
statute in question limiting the field of advertising was a direct burden on in-
terstate commerce. See State v. Salt Lake Pub. Co., 249 Pac. 474. The con-
tention for its validity was based on a legitimate exercise of the police power.
Prior to the present action the Kansas anti-cigarette statute was repealed and by
the laws of 1927, chapter 121, cigarettes were made fit subjects of barter and
sale subject only to stringent revenue laws; the constitutionality of this statute
was upheld in State v. Nossaman, 107 Kan. 715, 193 Pac. 347, 20 A. L. R. 921.
The competency of state legislatures to regulate, and even prohibit, the sale of
cigarettes within their respective states is well settled. Gundling v. Chicago, 177
U. S. 183, 20 Sup. Ct. 633, 44 L. Ed. 725; Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U. S. 343, 21
Sup. Ct. 132, 45 L. Ed. 255. Iowa, Nebraska, and possibly New York, Oklahoma,
and Wisconsin are in accord. The nature of cigarettes as articles of commerce
clothed with federal protection has long presented a mooted situation. It was
held in Blaufield v. State, 103 Tenn. 593, 53 S. W. 1090, that cigarettes were not
legitimate articles of commerce and that a sale in an original package would not
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come within the purview of the commerce clause. Directly contrary to this
holding is State v. Goetz, 43 W. Va. 495, 27 S. E. 225, wherein the court denies
the legislature the right of taxing cigarettes in packages of 20, imported from
foreign states; however, such a right is now universally upheld; Lloyd et al. v.
Richardson, 158 Ga. 633, 134 S. E. 37; Phillips v. Raynes, 120 N. Y. S. 1053;
City of Newport v. Wagner, 168 Ky. 641, 182 S. W. 834; Cooley on Taxation
(4th ed.) 818 et seq. An ordinance enacted in furtherance of municipal police
power prohibiting the smoking of cigarettes anywhere within the corporate limits
was held void for unreasonableness, Hershberg v. Barbourville, 142 Ky. 60, 133
S. W. 958. A similar ordinance restraining the smoking of tobacco was held
invalid, Zion v. Behrens, 262 Ill. 510, 104 N. E. 836. However, in Common-
wealth v. Thompson, 12 Met. (Mass.) 231, the court assumed the validity of a
statute prohibiting smoking in any "lane or passageway." Zion v. Behrens,
supra, seems to present the modem view of the subject.
Prior to the passage of the 18th amendment it was generally conceded that
the various states, in the exercise of their police power, had the authority to
prohibit the advertising for sale of intoxicating liquors, State v. J. P. Bass Pub.
Co., 104 Me. 288, 71 Atl. 894, declaring R. S. 1903, chap. 29, sec. 45, valid, and
State ex rel. West v. State Capitol Co., 24 Okla. 252, 103 Pac. 1021, upholding a
similar constitutional provision, (Bunn's Edition sec. 499) as a legitimate exer-
cise of the police power. These decisions cannot be considered as being in
conflict with the case under discussion because by the Williamson Act Con-
gress, to a large extent, withdrew intoxicating liquors from the protection of the
commerce clause of the federal constitution. In these cases the ultimate aim
of the advertiser, from an intrastate standpoint, was unlawful, while in the
Kansas case the sale of cigarettes was legal. The resulting interference with
interstate commerce in publications hence was justifiable in the absence of
Congressional legislation covering the same field.
Newspapers are subjects of commerce within the meaning of the constitu-
tion of the United States relating to commerce between the states, Preston v.
Finley, 72 F. 850; Post Printing Co. v. Brewster, 246 F. 321.
Mining coal has been held not to be interstate commerce, i. e., the production
of the commodity, per se, preparatory to shipment is but a means or a step to
the ultimate end, and is not, therefore, subject to the power of Congress to regu-
late it. United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co. et al., 259 U. S. 344, 42 Sup.
Ct. 570. The above case does not seem repugnant to the case here dis-
cussed because there is a vast difference between production and advertising-
the latter is more in the nature of an appeal to the public upon the merits of a
product and a means by which sales and consumption can be increased. As it
reaches beyond the borders of the state of publication it is interstate in character.
W. G. S., '28.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DuE PROCESS OF LAW-CLASSIFICATION OF RACEs.-A
Chinese citizen was refused admittance to a school for white children. He was
classed among the "colored" races and given the right to enter a school for
"colored" children furnishing an education equal to that offered in the school
for white children. Held, that he was not denied equal protection of the laws,
since the facilities furnished were equal to that offered to all, whether white,
brown, yellow or black. Ging Lum v. Rice, 48 Sup. Ct. 91, 72 L. ed. 79 (1927).
The right to a common school education is conferred solely by the state, and
does not exist in the absence of state laws. Lehew v. Brummel, 103 Mo. 546,
15 S. W. 765, 23 Am. St. Rep. 895, 11 L. R. A. 828. When provisions for schools
have once been made, however, the state cannot discriminate between persons
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